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Abstract
We investigate criteria for evaluating inﬁnite utility streams that satisfy Fixed-
step anonymity and includes some notion of overtaking or catching-up. We do so
in a generalized setting which do not require us to specify the underlying ﬁnite-
dimensional criterion (e.g., utilitarianism or leximin). We present axiomatiza-
tions that rely on weaker axioms than those in the literature, and which in one
case is new. We also provide a complete analysis of the relationships between
the symmetric parts of these criteria and likewise for the asymmetric parts.
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Recent contributions have suggested new social welfare relations for the purpose of
evaluating inﬁnite utility streams representing the welfare levels of an inﬁnite and
countable number of generations. Notable examples are Basu and Mitra (2007), who
extend the utilitarian ordering on a ﬁnite dimensional Euclidian space to the inﬁnite
dimensional case, and Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura (2007), who do likewise
for the leximin ordering. The fact that both these relations are incomplete (since
they can only compare utility streams whose tails are Pareto comparable beyond
some ﬁnite time) motivates the following question: How can their symmetric and
asymmetric parts be extended, so that a larger set of pairs of utility streams becomes
comparable. This is the question we consider in the present paper.
The social welfare relations of Basu and Mitra (2007) and Bossert, Sprumont and
Suzumura (2007) satisfy Finite anonymity (ensuring equal treatment of generations
by letting social evaluation be insensitive to ﬁnite permutations of utilities) and
Strong Pareto (ensuring sensitivity for the interests for each generation). Work by
Lauwers (2007) and Zame (2007) conﬁrms the following conjecture, suggested by
Fleurbaey and Michel (2003): it is not possible to construct and describe a complete
and transitive binary relation on the set of inﬁnite utility streams which satisﬁes the
axioms of Finite anonymity and Strong Pareto. Hence, if we are want to be consider
constructible social welfare relations satisfying Finite anonymity and Strong Pareto,
then completeness is an unreachable goal. Still, more comparability can be achieved
(i) by strengthening Finite anonymity and (ii) by including some notion of overtaking
or catching-up (in the tradition of Atsumi, 1965; von Weizs¨ acker, 1965).
Many authors (see, e.g., Lauwers, 1997a; Liedekerke and Lauwers, 1997; Fleur-
baey and Michel, 2003) have argued that a stronger axiom than Finite anonymity
is needed to reﬂect intergenerational equity in intertemporal preferences. However,
as is well-known, imposing insensitivity to all permutations of utilities contradicts
1Strong Pareto. Therefore, strengthening Finite anonymity while keeping Strong
Pareto must amount to adding insensitivity to some, but not all, inﬁnite permu-
tations. The set of ﬁxed-step permutations, introduced by Lauwers (1997b) and
analyzed by Fleurbaey and Michel (2003), is a strict superset of the set of ﬁnite
permutations.1 It is a consequence of the general results of Mitra and Basu (2007)
that Fixed-step anonymity, in the sense of insensitivity to ﬁxed-step permutations, is
consistent with Strong Pareto. Fixed-step anonymity has subsequently been added
to the criterion of Basu and Mitra (2007) (by Banerjee, 2006) and to the the criterion
of Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura (2007) (by Kamaga and Kojima, 2008a).
Asheim and Tungodden (2004) analyze two utilitarian overtaking and catching-
up criteria (as introduced by Atsumi, 1965, and von Weizs¨ acker, 1965) and two
leximin overtaking and catching-up criteria. The two former are compatible with
but lead to more comparability than Basu and Mitra’s (2007) criterion, while the
two latter do likewise to Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura’s (2007) criterion. While
extending Finite anonymity amounts to less sensitivity to the sequencing of utili-
ties, overtaking and catching-up criteria introduce more sensitivity to the order in
which utilities appear. Indeed, Kamaga and Kojima (2008b) show that Fixed-step
anonymity cannot be added to the utilitarian and leximin catching-up criteria.
In this paper we investigate inﬁnite-dimensional criteria that satisfy Fixed-step
anonymity and includes some notion of overtaking or catching-up. Following work
of d’Aspremont (2007) and Asheim, d’Aspremont and Banerjee (2008), we do so
in a generalized setting which do not require us to specify the underlying ﬁnite-
dimensional criterion (e.g., utilitarianism or leximin). We present axiomatizations
that rely on weaker axioms than those in the literature, and which in one case is
new. We also provide a complete analysis of the relationships between the symmetric
parts of these criteria and likewise for the asymmetric parts. Section 2 contains
1In a ﬁxed-step permutation, utilities are permuted within blocks of time of equal length.
2preliminaries, Section 3 introduces the social welfare relations and axioms we will
consider, Section 4 relates the axiom, Section 5 presents the axiomatization, while
Section 6 investigates the relationships between the various criteria.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation and Deﬁnitions
Let N denote the set of natural numbers {1,2,3,...} and R the set of real numbers.
Let X denote the set Y |N|, where Y ⊆ R is an interval satisfying [0,1] ⊆ Y . Let X
be the domain of utility streams; i.e., x ≡ (x1,x2,...) ∈ X iﬀ xn ∈ Y for all n ∈ N.
Write 0 ≡ (0,0,...). For x, y ∈ X, write x ≥ y iﬀ xi ≥ yi for all i ∈ N and x > y
iﬀ x ≥ y and x 6= y.
Subsets M, N of N will refer to nonempty subsets of ﬁnite cardinality, entailing
that N\M , N\N are coﬁnite sets (i.e., subsets of N which complements are ﬁnite).
For all x ∈ X and any N ⊂ N, write x = (xN,xN\N). For all n ∈ N, write
N(n) = {1,...,n}. Vectors (ﬁnite as well as inﬁnite-dimensional) are denoted by
bold letters, while the components of a vector are denoted by normal font.
A social welfare relation (SWR) is a reﬂexive and transitive binary relation de-
ﬁned on X (and denoted %) or Y |M| for some M ⊂ N (and denoted %M). A social
welfare order (SWO) is a complete SWR.
An SWR %0 is a subrelation of SWR %00 if (a) for all x, y ∈ X, x ∼0 y ⇒ x ∼00 y,
and (b) for all x, y ∈ X, x 0 y ⇒ x 00 y.
2.2 Permutations
A permutation π is a one-to-one map from N onto N. For any x ∈ X and a permu-
tation π, we write x ◦ π = (xπ(1),xπ(2),...) ∈ X. Permutations can be represented
by a permutation matrix, P = (pij)i,j∈N, which is an inﬁnite matrix satisfying:
(1) For each i ∈ N, pij(i) = 1 for some j(i) ∈ N and pij = 0 for all j 6= j(i).
3(2) For each j ∈ N, pi(j)j = 1 for i(j) ∈ N and pij = 0 for all i 6= i(j).
Given any permutation π, there is a permutation matrix P such that for x ∈ X,
x◦π = (xπ(1),xπ(2),...) can also be written as Px in the usual matrix multiplication.
Conversely, given any permutation matrix P , there is a permutation π deﬁned by
π = Pa, where a = (1,2,3,...). The set of all permutations is denoted by P.
A ﬁnite permutation π is a permutation such that there is some N ⊂ N with
π(i) = i for all i / ∈ N. Thus, a ﬁnite permutation matrix has pii = 1 for all i / ∈ N
for some N ⊂ N. The set of all ﬁnite permutations is denoted by F.
Given a permutation matrix P ∈ P and n ∈ N, we denote the n × n matrix
(pij)i,j∈{1,...,n} by P(n). Let
S = {P ∈ P | there is some k ∈ N such that, for each n ∈ N,
P(nk) is a ﬁnite dimensional permutation matrix}
denote the set of ﬁxed-set permutations. It is easily checked that this is a group
(with respect to matrix multiplication) of cyclic permutations.2
2.3 Axioms of Anonymity and Pareto
Let %M be an SWR deﬁned on Y |M|. Throughout we will assume that %M satisﬁes
the following anonymity condition, where the same permutation applies to the two
utility vectors. Hence, we call it “relative anonymity”. In the present intergenera-
tional context it can be interpreted as a time invariance property.
Axiom m-I (m-Relative Anonymity) For all xM, yM, uN, vN ∈ Y m with M =
{i1,i2,...,im} ⊂ N and N = {j1,j2,...,jm} ⊂ N for some m ∈ N, if there exists a
2A permutation is cyclic if for each e
i = (0,...,0,1,0....) (with 1 at the i
th place) there exists
a k ∈ N such that π
k(e
i) = e
i. The class of cyclic permutations is not necessarily a group, while P
is a group which does not contain only cyclic permutations.
4ﬁnite permutation π : {1,...,m} → {1,...,m} such that xiπ(k) = ujk and yiπ(k) =
vjk for all k ∈ {1,...,m}, then xM %M yM if and only if uN %N vN.
By satisfying m-I, %M depends only on the dimension |M|. We will henceforth
write %m for an SWR on Y m, thereby signifying that the SWR satisﬁes m-I.
One kind of basic axiom is the usual anonymity condition, where a permutation
is applied to the one utility stream only.
Axiom m-A (m-Anonymity) For all a, b ∈ Y m, if m ≥ 2 and a is a permutation
of b, then a ∼m b.
Since %m is transitive, m-A is equivalent to having a ∼m b whenever there exists
i, j ∈ {1,...,m} such that ai = bj, aj = bi and ak = bk for all k 6= i,j.
The m-Pareto Principle (a %P
m b if and only if a ≥ b) illustrates that m-I does
not imply m-A. However, as originally shown by d’Aspremont and Gevers (1977,
Lemma 4), the two axioms are equivalent if %m is complete.
Lemma 1 (Asheim, d’Aspremont and Banerjee, 2008, Lemma 1) If %m
with m ≥ 2 is complete, then %m satisﬁes m-A.
The other kind of basic axiom is the Pareto condition.
Axiom m-P (m-Pareto) For all a, b ∈ Y m, if a > b, then a m b.
Clearly, since %m is transitive, m-P is equivalent to having a m b whenever there
exists i ∈ {1,...,m} such that ai > bi and ak = bk for all k 6= i.
2.4 Proliferating sequences
Many well-known ﬁnite-dimensional SWRs form proliferating sequences (d’Aspre-
mont, 2007). Examples include the m-Grading Principle (a %S
m b if and only if there
exists a permutation c of b such that a ≥ c) and the utilitarian and leximin SWOs
(see Asheim, d’Aspremont and Banerjee, 2008, Section 5). The structure imposed
5by this concept on a sequence of ﬁnite-dimensional SWR enables the extension to an
inﬁnite-dimensional SWR to be analyzed at a generalized level, without considering
the speciﬁc nature of the ﬁnite-dimensional counterpart. Furthermore, it allows
inﬁnite-dimensional SWRs to be deﬁned solely on the basis of the 2-dimensional
version of the underlying ﬁnite-dimensional SWR.
An SWR % extends the SWR %m if, for all M ⊂ N with |M| = m and all x,
y ∈ X with xi = yi for every i ∈ N\M, xM m yM implies x  y, and xM ∼m yM
implies x ∼ y.
Deﬁnition 1 A sequence of SWRs, {%∗
m}∞
m=1, is proliferating if any SWR % that
extends %∗
2 also extends %∗
m for every m 6= 2.
3 Social welfare relations and axioms
Assume for the remainder of this paper that {%∗
m}∞
m=1 is a proliferating sequence
of Paretian SWOs. This means that, for each m ∈ N, %∗
m is complete and satisﬁes
m-A (by Lemma 1) and m-P (by assumption).
3.1 Axioms
Consider the following axioms, which are requirements on inﬁnite-dimensional SWRs
stemming from properties on the corresponding ﬁnite-dimensional SWOs.
We start with axioms that combines conditions for indiﬀerence and preference.
Axiom WC (Weak consistency) For all x, y ∈ X,
(a) if there exists m ∈ N such that (xN(n),0N\N(n)) ∼ (yN(n),0N\N(n)) for all
n ≥ m, then x ∼ y;
(b) if there exists m ∈ N such that (xN(n),0N\N(n))  (yN(n),0N\N(n)) for all
n ≥ m, then x  y.
Axiom SC (Strong consistency) For all x, y ∈ X,
6(a) if there exists m ∈ N such that (xN(n),0N\N(n)) % (yN(n),0N\N(n)) for all
n ≥ m, then x % y.
(b) if there exists m ∈ N such that (xN(n),0N\N(n)) % (yN(n),0N\N(n)) for all
n ≥ m, and for all m ∈ N, there exists n ≥ m such that (xN(n),0N\N(n)) 
(yN(n),0N\N(n)), then x  y;
Axiom PC (Pairwise continuity) For all x, y ∈ X, if for all m ∈ N, there exists
n ≥ m such that (xN(n),yN\N(n)) % y, then x % y.
Axioms WC and SC were introduced by Basu and Mitra (2007), while axiom PC
is due to Sakai (2008).
We continue with axioms that provides conditions for indiﬀerence only.
Axiom WIC (Weak indiﬀerence continuity) For all x, y ∈ X, if there exists m ∈ N
such that (xN(n),yN\N(n)) ∼ y for all n ≥ m, then x ∼ y.
Axiom SIC (Strong indiﬀerence continuity) For all x, y ∈ X, if for all m ∈ N,
there exists n ≥ m such that (xN(n),yN\N(n)) ∼ y, then x ∼ y.
Axiom SA (Fixed-step anonymity) For all x ∈ X and all P ∈ S, x ∼ Px.
Axiom WSIC (Weak ﬁxed-step indiﬀerence continuity) For all x, y ∈ X, if there
exist k, m ∈ N such that (xN(kn),yN\N(kn)) ∼ y for all n ≥ m, then x ∼ y.
Axiom WSIC1 (Weak ﬁxed-step indiﬀerence continuity 1) For all x, y ∈ X, if
there exists k ∈ N such that (xN(kn),yN\N(kn)) ∼ y for all n ∈ N, then x ∼ y.
Axioms WIC and SIC were discussed in Asheim and Tungodden (2004, Section
6) and were formally introduced in the earlier working paper version of that paper.
Axiom SA stems from Lauwers (1997b), and Mitra and Basu (2007) show that it
can be combined with SP since it is a group of cyclic permutations. It follows from
Proposition 1 below that Axiom WSIC1 is equivalent to part (ii) of Kamaga and
Kojima’s (2008b) Weak ﬁxed-step consistency axiom.
7Finally, we come to axioms that provides conditions for preference only.
Axiom SP (Strong Pareto) For all x, y ∈ X, if x > y, then x  y.
Axiom WPC (Weak preference continuity) For all x, y ∈ X, if there exists m ∈ N
such that (xN(n),yN\N(n))  y for all n ≥ m, then x  y.
Axiom WPC1 (Weak preference continuity 1) For all x, y ∈ X, if (xN(n),yN\N(n))
 y for all n ∈ N, then x  y.
Axiom SPC (Strong preference continuity) For all x, y ∈ X, if there exists m ∈ N
such that (xN(n),yN\N(n)) % y for all n ≥ m, and for all m ∈ N, there exists n ≥ m
such that (xN(n),yN\N(n))  y, then x  y.
Axiom SPC1 (Strong preference continuity 1) For all x, y ∈ X, if (xN(n),yN\N(n))
% y for all n ∈ N, and for all m ∈ N, there exists n ≥ m such that (xN(n),yN\N(n)) 
y, then x  y.
Axiom WSPC (Weak ﬁxed-step preference continuity) For all x, y ∈ X, if there
exist k, m ∈ N such that (xN(kn),yN\N(kn))  y for all n ≥ m, then x  y.
Axiom WSPC1 (Weak ﬁxed-step preference continuity 1) For all x, y ∈ X, if
there exists k ∈ N such that (xN(kn),yN\N(kn))  y for all n ∈ N, then x  y.
Axiom SSPC (Strong ﬁxed-step preference continuity) For all x, y ∈ X, if there
exist k, m ∈ N such that (xN(kn),yN\N(kn)) % y for all n ≥ m, and for all k, m ∈ N,
there exists n ≥ m such that (xN(kn),yN\N(kn))  y, then x  y.
Axiom SSPC1 (Strong ﬁxed-step preference continuity 1) For all x, y ∈ X, if
there exists k ∈ N such that (xN(kn),yN\N(kn)) % y for all n ∈ N, and for all k,
m ∈ N, there exists n ≥ m such that (xN(kn),yN\N(kn))  y, then x  y.
Axioms WPC and SPC were introduced by Asheim and Tungodden (2004), and ax-
iom WSPC1 was introduced by Kamaga and Kojima (2008b), while axiom SSPC
8is original to the present paper.
3.2 Generalized criteria
Consider the following “generalized criteria”, which can be specialized to the util-
itarian and leximin cases, since the utiliarian and leximin SWOs are proliferating
sequences of Paretian SWOs.
Deﬁnition 2 (Generalized overtaking) The generalized overtaking criterion
%∗
O generated by {%∗
m}∞
m=1 satisﬁes, for x, y ∈ X,
x ∼∗
O y iﬀ there exists m ∈ N such that xN(n) ∼∗
n yN(n) for all n ≥ m;
x ∗
O y iﬀ there exists m ∈ N such that xN(n) ∗
n yN(n) for all n ≥ m.
Deﬁnition 3 (Generalized catching-up) The generalized catching-up criterion
%∗
C generated by {%∗
m}∞
m=1 satisﬁes, for x, y ∈ X,
x %∗
C y iﬀ there exists m ∈ N such that xN(n) %∗
n yN(n) for all n ≥ m.
Deﬁnition 4 (Generalized ﬁxed-step anonymous overtaking) The general-
ized ﬁxed-step anonymous overtaking criterion %∗
SAO generated by {%∗
m}∞
m=1 satis-
ﬁes, for x, y ∈ X,
x %∗
SAO y iﬀ there exists P, Q ∈ S such that Px %∗
O Qy.
Deﬁnition 5 (Generalized ﬁxed-step overtaking) The generalized ﬁxed-step
overtaking criterion %∗
SO generated by {%∗
m}∞
m=1 satisﬁes, for x, y ∈ X,
x ∼∗
SO y iﬀ there exist k, m ∈ N such that xN(kn) ∼∗
kn yN(kn) for all n ≥ m;
x ∗
SO y iﬀ there exist k, m ∈ N such that xN(kn) ∗
kn yN(kn) for all n ≥ m.
Deﬁnition 6 (Generalized ﬁxed-step catching-up) The generalized ﬁxed-step
catching-up criterion %∗
SC generated by {%∗
m}∞
m=1 satisﬁes, for x, y ∈ X,
x %∗
SC y iﬀ there exist k, m ∈ N such that xN(kn) %∗
kn yN(kn) for all n ≥ m.
9In their utilitarian versions, %∗
O and %∗
C were introduced by Atsumi (1965) and
von Weizs¨ acker (1965), while the leximin versions appear in Asheim and Tungodden
(2004). In its utilitarian version, %∗
SC was suggested by Lauwers (1993) and further
analyzed by Fleurbaey and Michel (2003), while the corresponding overtaking crite-
rion, %∗
SO, was introduced by Kamaga and Kojima (2008b). Fixed-step anonymous
overtaking, %∗
SAO, was also introduced by Kamaga and Kojima (2008b), who also
show that the analogous ﬁxed-step anonymous catching-up is impossible.
4 Relating axioms
Following Sakai (2008), say that an SWR % strongly extends the SWR %m if, for all
M ⊂ N with |M| = m and all x, y ∈ X with xi = yi for every i ∈ N\M, xM %m yM
iﬀ x % y. The following observation is stated without proof.
Lemma 2 If an SWR % extends the SWR %m and %m is complete, then % strongly
extends %m.
Lemma 2 implies the following condition of separable present.
Proposition 1 Let {%∗
m}∞
m=1 be a proliferating sequence of SWOs and assume that
% extends %∗
2. For all x, y, u, v ∈ X and M ⊂ N, (xM,uN\M) % (yM,uN\M) iﬀ
(xM,vN\M) % (yM,vN\M).
It is corollary of Proposition 1 that
WIC ⇔ WC(a)
WPC ⇔ WC(b)
WIC & SPC ⇒ SC(a)
SPC ⇔ SC(b)
if {%∗
m}∞
m=1 is a proliferating sequence of SWOs and % extends %∗
2. Furthermore,
the following proposition entails that axiom WIC is superﬂuous.
10Proposition 2 Let {%∗
m}∞
m=1 be a proliferating sequence of Paretian SWOs and
assume that % extends %∗
2. Then axiom WIC is satisﬁed.
Proposition 2 follows directly from part (ii) of the following lemma.
Lemma 3 A proliferating sequence {%∗
m}∞
m=1 of Paretian SWOs satisﬁes:
(i) If xi = yi for some i ∈ N\M, then xM %∗
|M| yM iﬀ xM∪{i} %∗
|M|+1 yM∪{i}.
(ii) If there exists m ∈ N such that xN(n) ∼∗
n yN(n) for all n ≥ m, then xn = yn
for all n > m.
Proof. (i) Asheim, d’Aspremont and Banerjee (2008, Lemma 3(i)).
(ii) Let {%∗
m}∞
m=1 be a proliferating sequence of SWOs with, for each m ∈ N,
%∗
m satisfying m-P. Assume that there exists m ∈ N such that xN(n) ∼∗
n yN(n) for
all n ≥ m. Suppose that xn 6= yn for some n > m; w.l.o.g. we can set xn > yn. Since
%∗
n satisﬁes m-P, it follows from part (i) that
xN(n) ∼∗
n (yN(n−1),xn) ∗
n yN(n) ,
contradicting that xN(n) ∼∗
n yN(n). Hence, xi = yi for all n > m.
Hence, in our context WC can be replaced by the strictly weaker axiom WPC
and SC can be replaced by the strictly weaker axiom SPC. For this reason, we
will not consider WC and SC when axiomatizing the generalized overtaking and
catching-up criteria in the next section.
Observe that axiom PC implies axiom SIC, while as shown by Asheim and
Tungodden (2004, Section 6) SIC cannot be combined with SP under transitivity
(see also Fleurbaey and Michel, 2003). Hence, since we will be concerned with
Paretian SWRs, we will not apply axioms PC and SIC. Observe also that axioms
WSIC and WSIC1 are equivalent and imply each of axioms WIC and SA.
Clearly, axiom WPC implies axiom WPC1, and axiom SPC implies axiom
SPC1. However, when applied to an SWR that extends %∗
2, where {%∗
m}∞
m=1 is a
11proliferating sequence of Paretian SWOs, the following lemma implies that axioms
WPC and WPC1 are equivalent, and axioms SPC and SPC1 are equivalent.
Lemma 4 Let {%∗
m}∞
m=1 be a proliferating sequence of Paretian SWOs. If xN(m)
∗
m yN(m) for some m ∈ N, then there exists a ﬁnite permutation matrix P(m) such
that ˜ xN(m) = P(m)xN(m) and ˜ yN(m) = P(m)yN(m) satisfy ˜ xN(n) ∗
n xN(n) for all
n ∈ {1,...,m}.
Proof. Let P(m) have the property that ˜ x1−˜ y1 ≥ ˜ x2−˜ y2 ≥ ··· ≥ ˜ xm−1−˜ ym−1 ≥
˜ xm − ˜ ym, where it follows from axiom m-P and xN(m) ∗
m yN(m) that ˜ x1 > ˜ y1.
The result is shown by induction. By the premise, ˜ xN(m) ∗
m ˜ yN(m). Assume
that ˜ xN(n) ∗
n ˜ yN(n) for all n ∈ {` + 1,...,m}, where ` ∈ {1,...,m − 1}. The
inductive proof is complete by showing that ˜ xN(`) ∗
` ˜ yN(`).
If ˜ x`+1 ≥ ˜ y`+1, then ˜ xN(`) > ˜ yN(`) and ˜ xN(`) ∗
` ˜ yN(`) by axiom m-P.
If ˜ x`+1 < ˜ y`+1, then (˜ xN(`), ˜ y`+1) ∗
`+1 ˜ xN(`+1) ∗
`+1 ˜ yN(`+1) by axiom m-P. It
now follows from Lemma 3(i) that ˜ xN(`) ∗
` ˜ yN(`).
An SWR that extends %∗
2, where {%∗
m}∞
m=1 is a proliferating sequence of Paretian
SWOs, need not be able to compare x and y with x ≥ y, if for all m ∈ N, there
exists n ≥ m such that xn > yn. However, axiom SP is satisﬁed if WPC is added.
It is straightforward to show that axioms WSPC and WSPC1 are equivalent,
and axioms SSPC and SSPC1 are equivalent. Furthermore, axiom SSPC1 im-
plies axiom WSPC1, which in turn implies axiom WPC. It is not true, though,
that SSPC1 implies axiom SPC, while axiom SPC does imply axiom WPC.
The following ﬁgures show these relationships when % is an SWR that extends
%∗
2, where {%∗
m}∞
m=1 is a proliferating sequence of Paretian SWOs.
SA
⇑
WIC ⇐ WSIC1 ⇔ WSIC
12SP
⇑
WPC1 ⇔ WPC ⇐ WSPC1 ⇔ WSPC
⇑ ⇑ ⇑ ⇑
SPC1 ⇔ SPC SSPC1 ⇔ SSPC
5 Axiomatizations
In the present axiomatizations of the ﬁve generalized criteria listed in Section 3.2.
The axiomatizations of the ﬁrst four criteria rely on weaker axioms than those
provided in the literature (Asheim and Tungodden, 2004; Basu and Mitra, 2007;
Kamaga and Kojima, 2008b), while the axiomatization of the ﬁnal one is new.
Proposition 3 Let {%∗
m}∞
m=1 be a proliferating sequence of Paretian SWOs. Then
an SWR % extends %∗
2 and satisﬁes WPC1 iﬀ %∗
O is a subrelation of %.
Proof. Part I: If % extends %∗
2 and satisﬁes WPC1, then %∗
O is a subrelation
of %. Consider an arbitrary pair x, y ∈ X.
If x ∼∗
O y, then there exists m ∈ N such that xN(n) ∼∗
n yN(n) for all n ≥ m.
Since % extends %∗
n for all n ∈ N and, by Proposition 2, satisﬁes WIC, x ∼ y.
If x ∗
O y, then there exists m ∈ N such that xN(n) ∗
n yN(n) for all n ≥ m. Let
P ∈ F have the property that ˜ x = Px and ˜ y = Py satisfy ˜ x1− ˜ y1 ≥ ˜ x2− ˜ y2 ≥ ··· ≥
˜ xm−1− ˜ ym−1 ≥ ˜ xm− ˜ ym, while ˜ xn = xn and ˜ yn = yn for n > m. It now follows from
Lemma 4 that ˜ xN(n) ∗
n ˜ yN(n) for all n ∈ N. Since % extends %∗
n for all n ∈ N and
satisﬁes WPC1, ˜ x  ˜ y. Furthermore, %∗
m satisﬁes A and % extends %∗
m, implying
that x ∼ ˜ x and ˜ y ∼ y. By transitivity, x  y.
Part II: If %∗
O is a subrelation of %, then % extends %∗
2 and satisﬁes WPC. We
omit the straightforward proof of the result that % extends %∗
2.
To show that % satisﬁes WPC, assume that there exists m ∈ N such that
(xN(n),yN\N(n))  y for all n ≥ m. Since % extends %∗
2 and {%∗
m}∞
m=1 is a pro-
13liferating sequence of SWOs, it follows from Lemma 2 that xN(n) ∗
n yN(n) for
all n ≥ m. Hence, by the deﬁnition of O, x ∗
O y, and x  y since %∗
O is a
subrelation of %. This shows that % satisﬁes condition WPC.
Since WPC implies WPC1, parts I and II prove the proposition.
Proposition 4 Let {%∗
m}∞
m=1 be a proliferating sequence of Paretian SWOs. Then
an SWR % extends %∗
2 and satisﬁes SPC1 iﬀ %∗
C is a subrelation of %.
Proof. Part I: If % extends %∗
2 and satisﬁes SPC1, then %∗
C is a subrelation of
%. Consider an arbitrary pair x, y ∈ X.
If x ∼∗
C y, then there exists m ∈ N such that xN(n) ∼∗
n yN(n) for all n ≥ m.
Since % extends %∗
n for all n ∈ N and, by Proposition 2, satisﬁes WIC, x ∼ y.
If x ∗
C y, then (i) there exists m ∈ N such that xN(n) %∗
n yN(n) for all n ≥ m,
and (ii) for all m ∈ N, there exists n ≥ m such that xN(n) ∗
n yN(n). Hence,
we can pick m ∈ N with the property that xN(m) ∗
m yN(m) and xN(n) %∗
n yN(n)
for all n > m. Let P ∈ F have the property that ˜ x = Px and ˜ y = Py satisfy
˜ x1 − ˜ y1 ≥ ˜ x2 − ˜ y2 ≥ ··· ≥ ˜ xm−1 − ˜ ym−1 ≥ ˜ xm − ˜ ym, while ˜ xn = xn and ˜ yn = yn for
n > m. It now follows from Lemma 4 that (i) ˜ xN(n) %∗
n ˜ yN(n) for all n ∈ N and (ii)
for all m ∈ N, there exists n ≥ m such that ˜ xN(n) ∗
n ˜ yN(n). Since % extends %∗
n for
all n ∈ N and satisﬁes SPC1, ˜ x  ˜ y. Furthermore, %∗
m satisﬁes A and % extends
%∗
m, implying that x ∼ ˜ x and ˜ y ∼ y. By transitivity, x  y.
Part II: If %∗
C is a subrelation of %, then % extends %∗
2 and satisﬁes SPC. We
omit the straightforward proof of the result that % extends %∗
2.
To show that % satisﬁes SPC, assume that there exists m ∈ N such that
(xN(n),yN\N(n)) % y for all n ≥ m, and for all m ∈ N, there exists n ≥ m such that
(xN(n),yN\N(n))  y. Since % extends %∗
2 and {%∗
m}∞
m=1 is a proliferating sequence
of SWOs, it follows from Lemma 2 that there exists m ∈ N such that xN(n) %∗
n yN(n)
for all n ≥ m, and for all m ∈ N, there exists n ≥ m such that xN(n) ∗
n yN(n).
Hence, by the deﬁnition of %∗
C, x ∗
C y, and x  y since %∗
C is a subrelation of %.
14This shows that % satisﬁes condition SPC.
Since SPC implies SPC1, parts I and II prove the proposition.
Proposition 5 Let {%∗
m}∞
m=1 be a proliferating sequence of Paretian SWOs. Then
an SWR % extends %∗
2 and satisﬁes SA and WPC1 and iﬀ %∗
SAO is a subrelation
of %.
The proof of Proposition 5 relies on the following lemma.
Lemma 5 (Kamaga and Kojima, 2008b) Let {%∗
m}∞
m=1 be a proliferating se-
quence of Paretian SWOs. The generalized ﬁxed-step anonymous overtaking crite-
rion %∗
SAO generated by {%∗
m}∞
m=1 satisﬁes, for x, y ∈ X,
x ∼∗
SAO y iﬀ there exists P ∈ S such that Px ∼∗
O y;
x ∗
SAO y iﬀ there exist P, Q ∈ S such that Px ∗
O Qy.
Proof. This result follows from the proof of of Kamaga and Kojima (2008b,
Lemma 1) by noting that their properties P1, P2 and P3 (Kamaga and Kojima,
2008b, p. 16) are satisﬁed by a proliferating sequence of Paretian SWOs (note in
particular Lemmas 1 and 3(i) of the present paper).
Proof of Proposition 5. Part I: If % extends %∗
2 and satisﬁes SA and
WPC1, then %∗
SAO is a subrelation of %. Consider an arbitrary pair x, y ∈ X.
By Lemma 5, if x ∼∗
SAO y, then there exists P ∈ S such that Px ∼∗
O y. By
writing ˜ x = Px, this implies that there exists m ∈ N such that ˜ xN(n) ∼∗
n yN(n) for
all n ≥ m. Since % extends %∗
n for all n ∈ N and, by Proposition 2, satisﬁes WIC,
˜ x ∼ y. Furthermore, x ∼ ˜ x since % satisﬁes SA. By transitivity, x ∼ y.
By Lemma 5, if x ∗
SAO y, then there exist P, Q ∈ S such that Px ∗
O Qy.
Write ˜ x = Px and ˜ y = Qy. By Proposition 3, ˜ x  ˜ y since % extends %∗
n for all
n ∈ N and satisﬁes WPC1. Furthermore, x ∼ ˜ x and ˜ y ∼ y since % satisﬁes SA.
By transitivity, x  y.
15Part II: If %∗
SAO is a subrelation of %, then % extends %∗
2 and satisﬁes SA and
WSPC. We omit the straightforward proof of the result that % extends %∗
2.
To show that % satisﬁes SA, assume that there exists P ∈ S such that Px = y.
By Lemma 5, x ∼∗
SAO y since %∗
O is reﬂexive and x ∼ y since %∗
SAO is a subrelation
of %. This shows that % satisﬁes condition SA.
To show that % satisﬁes WSPC, assume that there exist k, m ∈ N such that
(xN(kn),yN\N(kn))  y for all n ≥ m. Since % extends %∗
2 and {%∗
m}∞
m=1 is a
proliferating sequence of SWOs, it follows from Lemma 2 that xN(kn) ∗
kn yN(kn)
for all n ≥ m. Let P ∈ S have the property that ˜ x = Px and ˜ y = Py satisfy
˜ x1 − ˜ y1 ≥ ··· ≥ ˜ xkm − ˜ ykm, while, for all n > m, ˜ xk(n−1)+1 − ˜ yk(n−1)+1 ≥ ··· ≥
˜ xkn − ˜ ykn. It now follows from the argument used in the proof of Lemma 4 that
˜ xN(n) ∗
n ˜ yN(n) for all n ∈ N. Hence, (i) by the deﬁnition of ∗
O, ˜ x ∗
O ˜ y, (ii) by
Lemma 5, x ∗
SAO y and, ﬁnally, (iii) x  y since %∗
SAO is a subrelation of %.
This shows that % satisﬁes condition WSPC.
Since WSPC implies WPC1, parts I and II prove the proposition.
Proposition 6 Let {%∗
m}∞
m=1 be a proliferating sequence of Paretian SWOs. Then
an SWR % extends %∗
2 and satisﬁes WSIC1 and WPC1 iﬀ %∗
SO is a subrelation
of %.
Proof. Part I: If % extends %∗
2 and satisﬁes WSIC1 and WPC1, then %∗
SO
is a subrelation of %. Consider an arbitrary pair x, y ∈ X.
If x ∼∗
SO y, then there exist k, m ∈ N such that xN(kn) ∼∗
kn yN(kn) for all
n ≥ m. Set ` = km. Then xN(`n) ∼∗
`n yN(`n) for all n ∈ N. Since % extends %∗
n for
all n ∈ N and satisﬁes WSIC1, x ∼ y.
If x ∗
SO y, then there exist k, m ∈ N such that xN(kn) ∗
kn yN(kn) for all
n ≥ m. Let P ∈ S have the property that ˜ x = Px and ˜ y = Py satisfy ˜ x1 − ˜ y1 ≥
··· ≥ ˜ xkm − ˜ ykm, while, for all n > m, ˜ xk(n−1)+1 − ˜ yk(n−1)+1 ≥ ··· ≥ ˜ xkn − ˜ ykn. It
now follows from the argument used in the proof of Lemma 4 that ˜ xN(n) ∗
n ˜ yN(n)
16for all n ∈ N. Since % extends %∗
n for all n ∈ N and satisﬁes WPC1, ˜ x  ˜ y.
Furthermore, x ∼ ˜ x and ˜ y ∼ y since % satisﬁes WSIC. By transitivity, x  y.
Part II: If %∗
SO is a subrelation of %, then % extends %∗
2 and satisﬁes WSIC
and WSPC. We omit the straightforward proof of the result that % extends %∗
2.
To show that % satisﬁes WSIC, assume that there exist k, m ∈ N such that
(xN(kn),yN\N(kn)) ∼ y for all n ≥ m, then x ∼ y. Since % extends %∗
2 and {%∗
m}∞
m=1
is a proliferating sequence of SWOs, it follows from Lemma 2 that xN(kn) ∼∗
kn yN(kn)
for all n ≥ m. Hence, by the deﬁnition of %SO, x ∼∗
SO y, and x ∼ y since %∗
SO is
a subrelation of %. This shows that % satisﬁes condition WSIC.
To show that % satisﬁes WSPC, assume that there exist k, m ∈ N such that
(xN(kn),yN\N(kn))  y for all n ≥ m. Since % extends %∗
2 and {%∗
m}∞
m=1 is a
proliferating sequence of SWOs, it follows from Lemma 2 that xN(kn) ∗
kn yN(kn)
for all n ≥ m. Hence, by the deﬁnition of ∗
SO, x ∗
SO y, and x  y since %∗
SO is
a subrelation of %. This shows that % satisﬁes condition WSPC.
Since WSIC implies WSIC1 and WSPC implies WPC1, parts I and II prove
the proposition.
Proposition 7 Let {%∗
m}∞
m=1 be a proliferating sequence of Paretian SWOs. Then
an SWR % extends %∗
2 and satisﬁes WSIC and SSPC1 iﬀ %∗
SC is a subrelation of
%.
Proof. Part I: If % extends %∗
2 and satisﬁes WSIC1 and SSPC1, then %∗
SC
is a subrelation of %. Consider an arbitrary pair x, y ∈ X.
If x ∼∗
SC y, then there exists k, m ∈ N such that xN(kn) ∼∗
kn yN(kn) for all
n ≥ m. Set ` = km. Then xN(`n) ∼∗
`n yN(`n) for all n ∈ N. Since % extends %∗
n for
all n ∈ N and satisﬁes WSIC1, x ∼ y.
If x ∗
SC y, then (i) there exist k, m ∈ N such that xN(kn) %∗
kn yN(kn) for all
n ≥ m, and (ii) for all k, m ∈ N, there exists n ≥ m such that xN(kn) ∗
kn yN(kn).
Set ` = km. Then xN(`n) %∗
`n yN(`n) for all n ∈ N, and (ii) for all k, m ∈ N, there
17exists n ≥ m such that xN(kn) ∗
kn yN(kn). Since % extends %∗
n for all n ∈ N and
satisﬁes SSPC1, x  y.
Part II: If %∗
SC is a subrelation of %, then % extends %∗
2 and satisﬁes WSIC
and SSPC. We omit the straightforward proof of the result that % extends %∗
2.
To show that % satisﬁes WSIC, assume that there exist k, m ∈ N such that
(xN(kn),yN\N(kn)) ∼ y for all n ≥ m, then x ∼ y. Since % extends %∗
2 and {%∗
m}∞
m=1
is a proliferating sequence of SWOs, it follows from Lemma 2 that xN(kn) ∼∗
kn yN(kn)
for all n ≥ m. Hence, by the deﬁnition of %SC, x ∼∗
SC y, and x ∼ y since %∗
SC is a
subrelation of %. This shows that % satisﬁes condition WSIC.
To show that % satisﬁes SSPC, assume that there exist k, m ∈ N such that
(xN(kn),yN\N(kn)) % y for all n ≥ m, and for all k, m ∈ N, there exists n ≥ m such
that (xN(kn),yN\N(kn))  y. Since % extends %∗
2 and {%∗
m}∞
m=1 is a proliferating
sequence of SWOs, it follows from Lemma 2 that there exist k, m ∈ N such that
xN(kn) %∗
kn yN(kn) for all n ≥ m, and for all k, m ∈ N, there exists n ≥ m such that
xN(kn) ∗
kn yN(kn). Hence, by the deﬁnition of %∗
SC, x ∗
SC y, and x  y since
%∗
SC is a subrelation of %. This shows that % satisﬁes condition SSPC.
Since WSIC implies WSIC1 and SSPC implies SSPC1, parts I and II prove
the proposition.
Our results are summarized in the following ﬁgure, where − signiﬁes that no
SWR satisfying the corresponding axioms exists, while + signiﬁes that an SWR
satisfying the corresponding axioms exists but is not analyzed here.3 The underlined
combinations are axiomatizations applying a set of weakest axioms.
3The non-existence results are reported in Kamaga and Kojima (2008b). A working paper
version of Kamaga and Kojima (2008b) analyzes the SWR satisfying W SPC1/W SPC only.
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∅ %∗
O %∗
O + + + + %∗
C %∗
C
WIC %∗
O %∗
O + + + + %∗
C %∗
C
SA %∗
SAO %∗
SAO %∗
SAO %∗
SAO + + − −
WSIC1 %∗
SO %∗
SO %∗
SO %∗
SO %∗
SC %∗
SC − −
WSIC %∗
SO %∗
SO %∗
SO %∗
SO %∗
SC %∗
SC − −
6 Concluding remarks
In the present paper we have provided axiomatizations that are weaker than those
found in the literature of overtaking and catching up criteria, in a generalized setting
where we do not have to discuss which ﬁnite-dimensional SWO is extended to the
inﬁnite-dimensional case.
Compared to Asheim and Tungodden (2004) we weaken WPC to WPC1 in
our characterization of the generalized overtaking criterion %∗
O and SPC to SPC1
in our characterization of the generalized overtaking criterion %∗
C. Compared to
Basu and Mitra (2007) we in addition remove WIC in our axiomatizations of these
criteria, as this axiom is not needed.
Compared to Kamaga and Kojima (2008b) we weaken WPC to WPC1 and
remove WIC in our characterization of the generalized ﬁxed-step anonymous over-
taking criterion %∗
SAO and weaken WSPC1 to WPC1 in our characterization of
the generalized ﬁxed-step overtaking criterion %∗
SO. Our axiomatization of the gen-
eralized ﬁxed-step catching-up criterion, %∗
SC, is new.
For the purpose of applying the axiomatization of the present paper to discuss
the relationships between the ﬁve diﬀerent generalized criteria we have considered,
adopt the following notation. For any generalized criterion R (where R = O, C,
SAO, SO or SC) and any proliferating sequence of Paretian SWOs, {%∗
m}∞
m=1,
19write
I(R,∗) := {(x,y) ∈ X2 | x ∼∗
R y},
P(R,∗) := {(x,y) ∈ X2 | x ∗
R y}.
for the symmetric and asymmetric parts of the criterion.
It follows directly from Propositions 3–7 and the logical relationships between
the axioms that, for any proliferating sequence of Paretian SWOs, {%∗
m}∞
m=1,
I(O,∗) ⊆ I(C,∗),
I(O,∗) ⊆ I(SAO,∗) ⊆ I(SO,∗) ⊆ I(SC,∗),
P(O,∗) ⊆ P(C,∗),
P(O,∗) ⊆ P(SAO,∗) ⊆ P(SO,∗) ⊆ P(SC,∗).
Furthermore, Deﬁnitions 2 and 3 imply that I(O,∗) = I(C,∗) and Deﬁnitions 5
and 6 imply that I(SO,∗) = I(SC,∗).4 Finally, Deﬁnitions 4 and 5 imply that
P(SAO,∗) = P(SO,∗), as pointed out by Kamaga and Kojima (2008b, Proposition
3).5 However, as the following examples demonstrate, all other inclusions are strict.
Consider the following six utility streams:
x : 1 0 1 0 1 0 ... 1 0 ...
y : 0 1 0 1 0 1 ... 0 1 ...
z : 1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2 ... 1
2
1
2 ...
4To see that I(SO,∗) ⊇ I(SC,∗), assume that x ∼
∗
SC y. I.e., there exist k
0, m
0, k
00, m
00 ∈ N such
that xN(k0n) %
∗
k0n yN(k0n) for all n ≥ m
0 and xN(k0n) -
∗
k00n yN(k00n) for all n ≥ m
00. Set k = k
0 · k
00
and m = max{m
0,m
00}. Then xN(kn) ∼
∗
kn yN(kn) for all n ≥ m, showing that x ∼
∗
SO y.
5To see that P(SAO,∗) ⊇ P(SO,∗), assume that x 
∗
SO y. I.e., there exist k, m ∈ N such that
xN(kn) 
∗
kn yN(kn) for all n ≥ m. Let P ∈ S have the property that ˜ x = Px and ˜ y = Py satisfy
˜ x1 − ˜ y1 ≥ ··· ≥ ˜ xkm − ˜ ykm, while, for all n > m, ˜ xk(n−1)+1 − ˜ yk(n−1)+1 ≥ ··· ≥ ˜ xkn − ˜ ykn. It now
follows from the argument used in the proof of Lemma 4 that ˜ xN(n) 
∗
n ˜ yN(n) for all n ∈ N. Hence,
by the deﬁnition of 
∗
O, ˜ x 
∗
O ˜ y, and by Lemma 5, x 
∗
SAO y.
20(0,x) : 0 1 0 1 0 1 ... 0 1 ...
(0,y) : 0 0 1 0 1 0 ... 1 0 ...
(1
2,y) : 1
2 0 1 0 1 0 ... 1 0 ... ,
and four more, u, v, u0, v0 ∈ X, deﬁned as follows:
um =

  
  
1 if m = n2 and n ∈ N odd,
0 otherwise.
vm =

  
  
1 if m = n2 and n ∈ N even,
0 otherwise.
u0
m =

      
      
1 if m = 2n2 and n ∈ N odd,
1
2 if m = 2n2 and n ∈ N even,
0 otherwise.
v0
m =

      
      
1
2 if m = 2n2 − 1 and n ∈ N odd,
1 if m = 2n2 − 1 and n ∈ N even,
0 otherwise.
We ﬁrst show that the remaining inclusions between the indiﬀerence sets are
strict. By Deﬁnition 2, it follows that (x,y) / ∈ I(O,∗) = I(C,∗) for any proliferating
sequence of Paretian SWOs, {%∗
m}∞
m=1. On the other hand, as %∗
SAO satisﬁes axiom
SA, (x,y) ∈ I(SAO,∗). By Lemma 5, it follows that (x,z) / ∈ I(SAO,∗) for
any proliferating sequence of Paretian SWOs, {%∗
m}∞
m=1. However, as pointed out
by Kamaga and Kojima (2008b), for the special case of proliferating sequence of
utilitarian SWOs, {%U
m}∞
m=1, Deﬁnition 5 implies that (x,z) ∈ I(SO,U) = I(SC,U).
We then show that the remaining inclusions between the preference sets are
strict. By Deﬁnition 2, it follows that neither ((0,x),(0,y)) nor ((0,x),(1
2,y)) is
an element of P(O,∗) for any proliferating sequence of Paretian SWOs, {%∗
m}∞
m=1,
21while they are both elements of P(SAO,∗), as %∗
SAO satisﬁes axiom SA and the
proliferating sequence of SWOs is Paretian. Deﬁnition 3 implies that, of these,
((0,x),(0,y)) ∈ P(C,∗), while ((0,x),(1
2,y)) / ∈ P(C,∗).
By Deﬁnition 5, it follows that neither (u,v) nor (u0,v0) is an element of P(SO,∗)
for any proliferating sequence of Paretian SWOs, {%∗
m}∞
m=1, while they are both
elements of P(SC,∗). Deﬁnition 3 implies that, of these, (u,v) ∈ P(C,∗), while
(u0,v0) / ∈ P(C,∗).
Finally, as we have seen, (x,y) ∈ I(SAO,∗) ⊆ I(SO,∗) = I(SC,∗) and thus,
(x,y) / ∈ P(SC,∗), while Deﬁnition 3 implies that (x,y) ∈ P(C,∗).
The observation that (x,y) ∈ I(SAO,∗) ⊆ I(SO,∗) = I(SC,∗), while ((0,x),
(0,y)) ∈ P(SAO,∗) = P(SO,∗) ⊆ P(SC,∗) illustrates the result that axiom SA
contradicts Koopmans’s (1960) Stationarity axiom (in the sense that preference over
future utilities should be independent of present utility) for any Paretian SWR.6 This
questions the desirability of achieving increased comparability by imposing Fixed-
step anonymity. On the other hand, relying on the overtaking and catching-up
criteria considered in the present paper amounts to an increased sensitivity to the
order in which utilities appear, which might also be less compelling. In a related pa-
per (Asheim, d’Aspremont and Banerjee, 2008), we discuss how to construct SWRs
to which Basu and Mitra’s (2007) and Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura’s (2007)
criteria are subrelations without compromising Stationarity and without introducing
increased sensitivity to the sequencing of utilities.
6Mitra (2007) discusses the problem of combining the Stationarity axiom with any kind of
extended anonymity.
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